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The Shaping of Threat Through Narration
Abstract
Threat is a problematic term since it is both objective and subjective in nature. It is in one
sense objective, especially in a national security perspective of capability to inflict harm,
but it is also highly subjective in how it is discussed and perceived. More often than not,
the very interpretation of the threat, influenced by threat narratives, dictates the reality of
the threat. Through the iterative process of narration and the inherent subjectivity that
narration introduces, a threat perception generally evolves in a direction away from
objectivity. The nature of threat narration is based on a two-part process of story-telling by
influencers and interpretation by an audience. Simply put, threat comes to life and is
molded into a comprehensible construct through threat narratives. This animation of the
threat is precisely where it is both simplified into digestible pieces while at the same time
careening away from an objective threat truth. Reconciling the impact of threat perception
and its detriment to threat truth is the focus of this article.
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Introduction
Threat is a problematic term since it is both objective and subjective in
nature. It is in one sense objective, especially in a national security
perspective of capability to inflict harm, but it is also highly subjective in
how people discuss and perceive it. The interpretation of the threat,
influenced by threat narratives, dictates the perception of the threat.
Through the iterative process of narration and the inherent subjectivity
that narration introduces, how threat is understood generally evolves away
from objectivity. The nature of threat narration is a two-step process of
storytelling by influencers and interpretation by an audience. Simply put,
threat comes to life through threat narratives. This animation of the threat
is precisely where it is both simplified into manageable pieces while at the
same time careening away from its objective base position.
Understanding that an objective notion of threat can exist along with a
subjective threat reality is important in how to view domestic threat
calculus and the decisions that states make with respect to their security.
When meaningful national security decisions are on the line, this
distinction between the objective and subjective perspectives of threat
becomes even more important. Assessing and debating the closest
approximation of threat in an objective sense while constructing barriers
to threat narration, rhetoric, and bias are key. Threat perceptions can
inflate quickly and identifying those root causes which artificially inflate or
deflate the threat picture are crucially important. Policy decisions based on
the subjective narratives lead states down false, often costly, and
dangerous paths.

Threat Narratives
The study of narratives has grown in recent years and especially around
narratives focusing on national security.1 The research focus on threat
inflation has increased with respect to the decisions around military
action. Much of the discussion around narrative creation and narrative
dominance pertains to knowledge, the sharing of knowledge, and the
perception of shared knowledge. President James Madison famously
stated,
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the management of foreign relations appears to be the most susceptible
of abuse, of all the trusts committed to a Government, because they can
be concealed or disclosed, or disclosed in such parts and at such times
as will best suit particular views; and because the body of the people
are less capable of judging and are more under the influence of
prejudices, on that branch of their affairs, than of any other.2
Thus, how a government or set of actors controls the dispensing of such
knowledge in the form of threat narratives is critically important.
Mona Baker has described narratives as “stories we tell ourselves and
others about the world(s) in which we live...[which] provide our main
interface with the world.”3 A narrative is a collective statement made up of
a series of overt statements and intimations around a topic. These
moments align to form a collective discourse that paints a story. Barry
Buzan and Lene Hansen noted that the orientation around a topic based
on the narrative could affect the various types of policy solutions. For
example, if security narratives on Cuba were orientated around
disarmament as opposed to the benefits of a market economy, the
resulting policy solutions for Cuba would live in the weapon reduction
space based on the directional narrative instead of economic and political
space.4
Christina Rowley and Jutta Weldes also expounded upon the concept of
security narratives by highlighting the selective nature of narratives as well
as their likeness to metaphors. They noted that a metaphor “invokes a
biological framework to account for and make sense of changes in
international security studies scholarship…produc[ing] and naturaliz[ing]
a narrative that, by privileging some facts while marginalizing others.”5
The intentionality by which narratives can be furthered adds a concerning
level of subjectivity.
Understanding how particular parties produce rhetoric and how the
resulting narratives achieve dominance is key to the reality of the threat.
Ronald Krebs’ book Narrative and the Making of US National Security
explores the importance of understanding narrative creation as part of the
larger threat discourse. He explains that while those in the national
security field acknowledge the presence of national security narratives,
they often underestimate their importance to threat reality. Krebs’ notes
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“dominant narratives of national security establish the common-sense
givens of debate, set the boundaries of the legitimate…[and] thereby shape
the national security policies that states pursue.”6 It is precisely through
the process of party influence on narrative evolution that dictates the
dominance of particular threats.
These theoretical underpinnings help us to address questions about threat
narratives pertaining to why people believe front-page threat headlines in
reputable papers such as The Wall Street Journal. Say, for example, the
headline reads, “Russian threat to the United States highest since the Cold
War!” Do people run for cover? Probably not, but the impact is significant.
Many Americans read newspaper headlines or tune in to radio or TV
coverage of national security affairs and then go about their day. For many
Americans, the 10 minutes of world news roundup in the morning and at
night forms the totality of their worldview. Rodger Payne believes this
deference has to do with how Americans en masse believe the experts
because of their greater access to information.7 Chaim Kaufman noted,
“Government agencies usually have a large authority advantage in debate
with anyone else. This is particularly true in realms where they have an
information advantage and do not face competing authorities of
comparable stature.”8 This is the case for government elites in the national
security arena as well as highly informed newscasters, journalists, and
academics who speak on topics with a certain level of inherent authority.
News headlines stay top of mind precisely because they fall into the
narrative containers that people use to order the many pieces of
information that we receive during a day. Truing back to the Russian
threat example, visual images in the past of Vladimir Putin and Barack
Obama on CNN or in The New York Times staring each other down
supports this narrative. Russia’s attempts several years ago to exert control
in Syria with its air campaign and sustained military support as well as its
increased influence in Crimea with its backing of Russian-sympathizing
rebels in the Ukraine adds credence to this narrative. Alleged Russian
hacking of American email accounts and 2016 Presidential Election
interference are key stories that help to support a narrative. This
supporting cast of stories creates a holistic threat narrative around Russia.
While Russia could be taking several actions that run contrary to American
interests around the world, the great leap to judgement that Russia is now
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the most significant threat to the United States becomes part of an
overarching narrative.
Americans, however, make this leap, for several reasons. First, the
narrative comes from a reputable source. Second, the human mind prefers
things to be neat and organized. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson noted
in Metaphors We Live By that “linguistic expressions are containers for
meaning.”9 If the narrative about Russia’s threat primacy did not exist,
there would be no neat cubbyhole to store all of these one-off Russian
threat stories. The human mind loves mnemonic devices to help categorize
information. These aide-mémoire narratives help to do just that. Third,
people are busy and are generally not willing to refute the larger threat
narrative statement. Their lives get in the way and as simpleminded as this
paints many people, they are too busy to refuture the threat narratives that
are top of mind. If the old adage is you are what you eat, a similar one here
with respect to threat could be you believe what you hear. If the TV in the
office break room displays FOX or CNN programming, people getting their
morning coffee will passively hear these narratives in an almost subliminal
way. While, of course, this broad-brush generalization does not apply to all
Americans, it does capture how threat narratives create a subjective threat
reality that can run contrary to an objective threat truth.
A cacophony of threat narratives exist in both the public and government
spheres when painting a particular country’s threat status. Indeed, pundits
debate these views in the media canvas of books, television, and the
internet, while intelligence analysts conduct a behind the scenes analysis
and debate which results in national security assessments. Both
perspectives on threat carry their own merits and together present a
robust view of perceived threat from a foreign country. Public narrative
producers have more diversity and a freer transfer of ideas while
government narrative producers may have access to better, or more,
information. To say that public threat narratives do not influence
government threat narratives would be naïve. In fact, even government
assessments cite public, mainstream books in their analysis. However,
only on rare occasions of disclosure are government threat narratives fully
divulged to the public. More often than not, the DIA, CIA, or White House
only present high-level summaries in annual reviews or Congressional
testimony.
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Since a multitude of actors such as government, media, academia, and
think tanks produce threat narratives, the ideological biases of specific
threat narratives vary widely. For the threat narrative producers and those
who follow their discussions, the debates are rich and the players are well
informed. The majority of people who sit on the sidelines, however,
routinely accept the storylines at face value. In these situations, the public
rarely comments on or challenges the narrative and almost blindly accepts
it. These storylines professed by pundits become both the perception and
reality for Americans around threat.
Political scientist William Connolly has written extensively about
perceptions and understanding reality. He has said that television
predigests what people watch and then relays to the audience those
perceptions already organized by others. The talking heads of newscasts
often pretend to report issues as they are, but more often than not, present
material that is colored by their own biases or that of their institution.10
Similarly, threat narratives that are pitched to the American public by the
media, or to government officials by the intelligence community, are
predigested interpretations of threat and therefore reflect an inherent bias.
Just as television can serve as a forcing mechanism and venue to impart
thoughts, threat narratives can similarly shape perceptions around
national security reality.
In his book The Social Construction of What?, Ian Hacking discussed the
notion of social construction which examines how people’s surroundings
influence their perception. When applying social construction to threat
narratives, it can yield new ways to look at national security dilemmas. In
many ways, threat narratives help to bring a new, perhaps even wholly
unknown, concept to the fore. Hacking offered an example of the child
viewer of television to demonstrate how two unrelated nouns (child and
viewer of television), which previously were not a known entity, moved
into the realm of a collective idea through social construction. It became a
coherent concept, an object of research, a focal point for world
conferences, a marketing audience for products, and even a protected
group by which security regulations and devices were created to protect
against violent and dangerous TV content.11 By virtue of social
construction, a previously unknown term or idea had built a following
through a crescendo of public activity as to engrain itself into everyday
usage. The time for this movement from obscurity to household
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consciousness is amazingly brief based on the highly connected nature of
people today. National security narratives emerge, solidify, and become a
household term in a similar way as in the example of Chinese cyber
attacks. Chinese cyber attacks have become a topical security narrative
that national security experts assemble around to discuss.
Understanding how threat narratives emerge, gain traction, and either
engrain themselves or whither on the vine is important to comprehending
this evolution of threat reality. The evolution of threat narratives informs
the movement of a foreign country from threat to ally status. This
changing threat status informs the important question of why countries
shift between friend and foe. The potential explanations for this transition
in threat status are manifold: A foreign country’s actions or change in its
capabilities, perceptions of change, political contestations at home or
abroad, or some combination of each. Domestic threat narratives play a
significant role in shaping a country’s status. While this appears to
conflate different epistemological premises of the creation of threat
narratives with the objective relationship between those narratives and
threat reality, the construction of threat narratives and resulting formation
of threat reality appear to coincide. To presume that there is something
distinctive between threat discourse and threat itself discounts the
constructive nature by which narratives codify reality.
The domestic environment acts as an incubator for new narrative creation
on notions of insecurity. Alan Wolf’s The Rise and Fall of the Soviet
Threat noted that domestic factors in the United States, more so than
Soviet factors during the Cold War, directly led to the rise and fall of the
Soviet threat and production of threat narratives. Bureaucratic politics in
the Pentagon, rivalries between different branches of government, and
foreign policy and economic disagreements between the elites built threat
narratives around the Soviet Union that were more subjective in nature
than what could be attributable through an objective, scientific method.12
Theories of threat inflation also focus on the influence of domestic actors
and their narratives to influence national security policy change. Figure 1
below shows a simple model of threat inflation developed by Jane Cramer
and Trevor Thrall. In this model, elites perceive and communicate notions
of threat, which then compete within a marketplace of other notions of
threat.13
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Figure 1. Threat Inflation Model
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Whereas the U.S. government threat assessment portion of the narration
ends with the influencing of the policy makers, this model continues with
influencing of the public and the policy creation. The U.S. government
threat assessment influences the elite threat perception, which then
influences the rest of this model. This model is important for it starts with
an objective truth about threat (actual conditions) and then has several
layers of perception, narration and communication, influence, and
interpretation before creating national security policy. It lays out the
multiple touchpoints of subjectivity in the threat calculus prior to policy
creation.
The narrative in and of itself is a convention that allows for an inherent
interjection of subjectivity. As Lakoff and Johnson stated, there is a
constant contradiction between myths of subjectivity and objectivity in
how humans see the world. They noted that since the time of the Greeks,
“there has been in Western culture a tension between truth, on the one
hand, and art, on the other, with art viewed as illusion.”14 In the
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that absurdity in the “use of metaphors,
tropes, and other rhetorical figures, instead of words proper.”15 In this
sense, narratives are the metaphors and tropes that humans both create
and use to understand threat.
This is not to say that all threat narratives are intentionally deceiving in
nature and embellish an objective state; however, the creation of a
convention to help the understanding of a threat and couch the issue in a
contemporary landscape introduces the possibility of subjectivity. Even
John Locke, in his work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
noted that empiricist tradition calls figurative speech and rhetoric as an
enemy of truth where “all artificial and figurative application of words
eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else, but to insinuate wrong
ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement.”16 It is
therefore critically important to use clear and precise language, and even
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this standard is murky as it attempts to remove interpretation. The reality
is that even in the pursuit of objectivity, subjectivity is a part of the
equation based on how humans “understand the world through our
interactions with it.”17

Threat Perception versus Threat Truth
While the discussion up until this point has examined how the narrative
process employs rhetoric to create a wholly new reality of threat, the
balance of this article will examine the differences between threat
perception (threat reality) and threat truth. With respect to the term of art
of threat perception, it is important to note that it is synonymous with
threat reality because reality reflects the influence of the environment on
threat calculus. The idea that an objective threat truth can exist while
forces work to move the perception of threat away from its accurate
depiction is at the heart of this discussion. The danger in this loss of
accuracy lies in the fact that threat perception and not threat truth dictates
national security policy decisions. This error leads to a faulty allocation of
scarce resources as well as potential misleading threat escalation.
In an attempt to separate the notions threat truth from threat perception,
we need to start at the basics of what threat is and what it is not. The
concept of security is derived from the Latin securitas, and root securus,
which means “without a care.”18 Security is the condition of being free
from harm or threat in both the physical and psychological perspectives.19
Traditional national security conceptions have been based largely on the
protection of the state against external, physical threats. Today, however,
additional notions of security exist at the psychological level from the
perspective of the individual, religion, culture, and gender or sexual
orientation.20 Threat in the most general sense is the infliction of harm at
any of these levels. However, national security threats generally concern
the physical or economic harm inflicted against the state or political unit.
This threat involves both the actual homeland as well as interests abroad.
The discussion of threat in this article focuses on the national security
perspective in order to emphasize the objective and subjective dimensions
of threat.
If national security is the state’s pursuit of being safe from harm, threat is
simply the manifestation of harm that impinges upon this sense of state
55
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.2.1754

Ciovacco: The Shaping of Threat Through Narration

security. With this as the conceptual backdrop for threat, it would appear
that a knowable, objective notion of national security threat could exist.
After all, the pursuit of knowing the actual threat that foreign powers pose
has been the Holy Grail for the professional American intelligence
apparatus for the past half century. The field of intelligence analysis is a
good place to begin the discussion since no other profession has spent
more time trying to understand threat. Illustrating this pursuit of threat
objectivity, or threat truth, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director Allen Dulles adopted biblical verse John 8:32, “and ye shall know
the truth and the truth shall make you free” as the CIA’s motto. While
intelligence seeks the truth or objective state of the actual threat situation,
sources of influence – either at the hands of the enemy to hide the actual
conditions or domestic bias through threat narration – often mask this
view.21
The idea that by employing the scientific method, one can know the exact
truth about another country’s threat is the basis of an objective notion of
threat. Threat in a national security sense is a summation of a foreign
nation’s capabilities and intent to do harm. For many years, this has been
the equation for threat in the U.S. government. In some cases, where
material capabilities are the driving factor of the threat, the number of
divisions, tanks, planes, or missiles would seem knowable. Either these
material capabilities exist or they do not. The problem is that foreign
leaders’ intent to use these military devices is often difficult to judge
objectively. How another human being thinks and feels as well as how they
would employ foreign military might is truly the great unknown even
though methods exist to approximate this intent.
Regarding this notion of threat truth highlighted in the CIA’s motto, one
should acknowledge that truth lives on shaky ground in political science.
Truth with respect to political science is not something provable in an
empirical sense. Truth has normative underpinnings and is value-laden. In
this discussion, the word truth denotes the actual conditions on the
ground when considering another country’s threat to the US. The term is
based on Sherman Kent’s attribution that a truth can exist for threat
analysis. Known as the father of modern American Intelligence, Kent was
the first head of the CIA’s assessment division known as the Office of
National Estimates. What Kent believed was that the actual conditions or
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accurate portrayal of another country’s strategic stature (capabilities) was
knowable.
In this discussion, parallels exist between the notion of a knowable threat
truth and truth as defined in scientific realism, which adopts a scientific
approach to the real.22 In the vein of scientific realism, truth is explained
in the world by noting, “physics aims at the truth, and if it succeeds, it tells
the truth.”23 As Kent believed that intelligence analysis employs the
scientific method, his search for threat truth aligned closely with scientific
realism in the acknowledgement that a truth could exist to be found or
proven. Kent said that intelligence research is “capable of giving us the
truth, or a closer approximation to truth…like the method of physical
science.”24
Kent noted that a country’s strategic stature and views of itself and
towards others dictated how it would act in the international arena. This
was another way of saying the threat that a country poses represents a
calculation of its capabilities and intent. He said,
I have urged that if we have knowledge of Great Frusina’s [Kent’s
hypothetical great power] strategic stature [Kent’s term for the totality of a
nation’s capabilities – military, political and economic—to act on the
international scene], knowledge of her specific vulnerabilities, and how
she may view these, and knowledge of the stature and vulnerabilities of
other states part to the situation, you are in a fair way able to predict her
probable courses of action.25
In other words, if you can determine a country’s capabilities and
intentions, you can make an accurate assessment of that country’s threat.
Moreover, Kent believed that knowing what Great Frusina has done in the
past and what its current situation is would help you better understand its
intent.26 Thus, understanding capabilities and intent would get you closer
to the truth about a country’s actual threat. The truth about threat was not
an abstract term to Kent or the CIA nor was it a guess; it was an objective,
scientifically derived depiction of actual harm. Subjectivity had little place
in this conception of threat. Kent limited the playing field of threats to the
external, state centric kinds.
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As previously noted, Kent likened the study of intelligence to scientific
methods in social sciences. Kent stated, “research is the only process
which we of the liberal tradition are willing to admit is capable of giving us
the truth.”27 While Kent viewed intelligence analysis as an objective
pursuit resulting in truth, subjectivity generally creeps into the equation in
the form of interpretations and perceptions used to fill the knowledge
gaps. The intelligence community found it easier to assess threat against
those actors who displayed intent and capability than more expanded
views of threat that included inanimate sources of threat such as
earthquakes and other non-actor based threats.
While the case is made for the existence of a threat truth, uncertainty still
exists in how one can actually arrive at an accurate depiction of this
notion. Several factors serve to cloud attempts at threat truth such as
knowledge gaps in another country’s intent and capabilities as well as the
speed with which intent can change. The intent of a country with respect
to the United States can change relatively rapidly based on changes to both
its domestic environment and political leadership. The United States tasks
its intelligence apparatus with trying to understand the intent of decisionmakers in other countries; however, this intent may not be fully decided
and could be fleeting. A friendly intent could in fact give way to a more
hostile intent and this transitory nature makes the ascertaining of the
threat truth a short-lived endeavor that requires frequent revisits.
Now that we have discussed how an objective notion of threat can exist, let
us turn our attention to how subjectivity influences reality. If threat truth
is the objective conception of threat, threat perception is what occurs when
you add the influencers and narration about threat. This is precisely where
the distinction between threat truth and threat perception comes into
view.
The difference between threat perception and threat truth can best be
described as threat perception being the threat as we know it to be or the
as is, while threat truth on the other hand is the objective position of threat
or the accurate location of threat. In other words, threat truth is the
normative construction of threat—what should or ought to be in a
philosophical sense. This distinction between reality and truth is similar to
how Hacking discussed the distinction between that which is socially
constructed and that which is real.28 Hacking’s socially constructed notion
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would mirror threat perception while the conception of real would
represent truth. Hacking notes that social constructivists constantly
debate adjectives such as objective and real. Those in the constructivist
camp often believe the use of truth and real to be free-floating
constructions in nature.29 However, even constructivists do acknowledge
the presence of this scientific realism or scientific truth. This real, actual
situation or truth often differs from the socially constructed reality where
the latter is reflective of the subjectivity and influences of the world around
us.
An example from history, which helps to illustrate this distinction between
threat perception and threat truth, is the American-Soviet missile gap
during the Cold War. American intelligence professed a significant missile
gap in the 1950s with the Soviets possessing 1000-1500 intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) compared to only 100 ICBMs for the United
States. The prevailing thought was that the United States was on the
wrong end of a missile gap of greater than 10 times. This was American
threat perception and was what American force planners used in military
armament and policy decisions. The gap produced threat narratives and
an entire generation of Americans grew up hiding under school desks
during air-raid drills fearing Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles. It was the
threat perception based on threat assessments, threat narratives, and the
perspective of Americans in an anxiety-laden environment. In retrospect,
however, the actual conditions (or threat truth) showed that the Soviets
only had four ICBMs—less than one half of one percent that which
American intelligence assessors believed to be true.30 The threat truth was
that the U.S. missile capability was greater than 20 times the Soviet
missile capability and no actual missile gap threat existed for Americans.
Threat perception always trumps threat truth because threat perception
drives force planning, military budget decisions, and policy execution.
Threat truth often exists on the other side of the curtain and is often only
fully ascertained in retrospect.
One of the most significant causes for this disparity between threat truth
and threat perception are threat narratives and the narrative process by
which influencers discuss threats. Influencers exert vast power in how they
talk about threat and encourage others to think about it. Special interests,
pundits, and even well intentioned newscasters place their bias on a threat
by how they talk about it and elevate its exposure. These influencers
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dictate threat discussion in public by way of steering the discourse on the
topic. Threat narratives are essentially the byproducts of influencers. The
iterative process of influencers building threat narratives plays a large part
in creating the divergence between a single, objective threat truth and
various, competing threat realities.

Influencers
The idea that threat is malleable supports the notion that influence,
interpretation, and social construction play a large role in creating a threat
reality. Those who possess the power to influence can define threat in
many ways. Leaders, pundits, and generally anyone with influencing
access (authors, newscasters, academics, politicians, movie stars, and
athletes) label threat and steer its understanding. Even today, politicians
shape threats along a spectrum from existential to limited or confined.
For example, some pundits have labeled the threat from terrorism against
the United States as existential when viewed as a large, capable army of
radical Islamists attempting to end the American way of life. This view of
threat paints an absolute vulnerability to American existence.
Alternatively, some pundits define the domestic threat from terrorism as
more limited in nature in the sense that only a relatively few, generally
inept lone wolves set off inert bombs or fall into FBI sting operations.
Political administrations, cable news networks, and think tanks often latch
on to one of these terrorism threat narratives and profess the narrative to
the public. As with most sets of extremes, the objective threat truth or
actual threat situation usually lives somewhere between the two poles of
where the influencers are trying to take the populace.
The battle lines appear to be hardening with respect to influencers and
their indifference to positions of neutrality. Many mainstream
publications are perfectly content to declare themselves of a particular
opinion. Online publications will even acknowledge their political
persuasions on their homepage. They will overtly acknowledge their
generally left leaning liberal or conservative tendencies. Television
networks and newspapers make similar declarations. With the influencing
strength of these forums, it is obvious how the narratives that these
organizations further often lean a particular direction and intend to
influence their audiences.
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A critical danger of influencers moving the populace in any particular
direction is that it by definition moves the perception of reality away from
the threat truth. Special interests exert considerable resources to help
Americans think a certain way. Public relations groups and large
marketing agencies also make significant fortunes telling a certain story
that someone would like them to tell. Often this story is part of a larger
agenda and unfortunately does not always reconcile with the truth about
threat. A preponderance of resources could result in a group’s narrative
becoming the dominant narrative of the day

Doomed Endeavor?
Since threat narration implicitly introduces bias, is the study and
understanding of threat a doomed endeavor? The answer lies in the level
of effort applied to the correct usage of language and identification of bias.
It will be critical to promote transparency around threat as well as the
sources that create bias in the system. While perhaps hard to come by,
neutral actors who can help to dispel the veil of bias and subjectivity
should be elevated. We should identify and vilify rhetoric not only for its
political lean, but also for how it influences away from any semblance of
truth. As Hobbes noted, words proper should be the goal instead of
rhetoric. Faulty reality is a result of bias in the system and appears at the
cost of truth. An objective truth around threat is the Holy Grail of national
security assessment and discussion and should be the aspiration for those
engaged in and sincerely interested in understanding harm at the
international level.
We should make a conscious effort to acknowledge the dichotomy of threat
truth and threat perception. Understanding that an objective notion of
threat could exist as well as a subjective notion is a powerful starting point.
This base acknowledgment will actually undercut the level of impact of
influencers who are increasingly selling their bias to the American
populace. Flagging those more egregious influencers who steer the
American people away from objective notions of threat is also an
interesting idea. Imagine a world where we could apply a rating system to
threat narrative producers. In this model, the lower the score would
approximate neutrality and the pursuit of objectivity. This rating system
around bias would highlight the more egregious influencers of threat
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narrative subjectivity and encourage debate about their ideas. Watchdog
groups could have a true impact by identifying those sources of bias in the
national security conversation. While a point system is an interesting
concept to apply to news outlets as a way to gauge bias or lack thereof,
identifying who or what would hold the power of objectivity to judge
another’s neutrality would be the challenge.
The answer, however, to whether the pursuit of threat truth is a doomed
endeavor is a simple one. The answer is no, if we are willing to take the
time to promote correct usage of language with respect to threat and to
publicly identify sources of threat bias. This advocacy will take the wind
out of the sails of bias threat narration and the threat truth will become
more apparent. Constantly challenging the conceptions of truth is also a
powerful antidote to the passive acceptance of threat narration. To simply
sit back and take in the evening news without challenging the narratives or
scrolling through social media stories without questioning the author’s
intentions helps to further the bias in narrative creation. Challenging
conventions with the excitement of youth is powerful in the quest for
threat truth and the casting away of blind acceptance of false threat
narratives.
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